Igor Linge, deputy director of Nuclear Safety Institute

– Supplies of Russian fuel to Bushehr NPP have nothing to do with the problem of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons

As far as I know, from the very beginning the key conditions of the construction of Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant were IAEA’s control throughout the project and return of spent nuclear fuel to Russia. Those conditions exclude any possibility of use of the Russian fuel for any other purpose. So, the supplies of nuclear fuel to Bushehr NPP have nothing to do with the problem of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

No “double standards” are possible at a nuclear power plant that is controlled by IAEA round-the-clock. Any attempt to deviate from the terms of the contract will be followed by sanctions.

As regards Iran’s military nuclear program, even US sources admit that there is no such program in that country. I don’t think that the Iranians might take so much pain just to get fuel that does not contain enough uranium for production of nuclear weapon, especially, as they already produce uranium on their centrifuges. 

As regards Iran’s peaceful program, I have repeatedly said that its rate may be not as high as reported by the Iranians and as we would like it to be, but, we cooperate with Iran exactly under its peaceful nuclear program.

That’s why I am deeply convinced that there is not threat to the nonproliferation regime and Russia may continue acting in the framework of the agreements provided that all the above conditions are observed.