Leonid Bolshov, director of Nuclear Safety Institute

– Stability of Russian fuel supplies will contribute to strengthening of nonproliferation regime

Today, Iran has received the first delivery of our fuel for its Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant: 44 fuel assemblies with maximum uranium enrichment of 3.62%, i.e. less than the Iranians can produce themselves (3.7%) and much less than the weapons-grade degree. The maximum degree for low-enriched peaceful uranium is 20%. Uranium enriched to a higher degree is subject to special control. Low-enriched uranium poses no threat to the nonproliferation regime. Bushehr NPP project is not subject to UN Security Council sanctions (resolutions 1737 and 1747) as it is an absolutely civil project.

The real problem would arise if we failed our contractual obligations and refused to supply fuel to Bushehr NPP. In such a case, the Iranians would be forced to start to enrich uranium on their own. So, our refusal might push Iran towards weapons-grade uranium production.

As regards irradiated fuel, Russia and Iran have an inter-governmental agreement stipulating that the fuel should be returned to Russia. Iran will not be able to enrich our fuel to higher degrees as all operations related to the fuel will be closely controlled by IAEA.

The US intelligence has admitted that Iran is not plotting any secret military programs. If we meet our contractual obligations and supply Bushehr NPP with fuel, Iran will have no more arguments to justify its possible military activities. Hence, the stability of Russian fuel supplies will contribute to the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime.